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"La nation est tout ce qu'elle peut être par cela seul qu'elle est"
"Au-delà du système représentatif l n'y a qu'usurpation, superstition et folie"
The official "Jacobin" reading of the French Revolution, that is the paradigm
which, from Michelet to Soboul, by way of Jaurés, to Vovelle himself, has given
privilege to the "social" aspect of the revolution, has shown at the same time an
unusual lack of interest in the problems of its political theory, and more specifically
the theory of the State. Both spheres, however, would, in view of revolutionary
events, undergo a development of the utmost interest. Therefore, the importance
given to the Robespierrean discourse, which can easily be found in any bibliography
in use on the Revolution, has been turned into the silencing, if not the distortion of
E.J. Sieyes' exceptional contribution.
In fact, the severe neglect and disregard afforded to the thinking and system
of the one who at the time opened up the French Revolution by directing the change
of the general States into a National Assembly. Of the one who, after following a long
career, would similarly contribute to its closure, firstly in Thermidor, then in Brumario,
and lastly with Napoleon Bonaparte. All this contrasts with the importance of his
political position, now actively, now "derrière le rid au", and above all with the unique
clarity and depth of his thoughts on the revolutionary State.
An eloquent proof of this margination is given by the fact that Sieyes' work,
apart from the Essay on Privileges and What is the Third State? has never been
published again in France. With the odd exception to date (i.e. the Thermidor
speeches, by Bastid), and only very recently, of D rigny's edition currently being
prepared, has such an unjustifiable omission begun to be rectified.
But not only has the abbot been forgotten. In fact, if we compare his discourse
to that of the 1791 Constituents, his specific position has also been distorted,
identifying it "tout court" with that constitutional text, without regard for the final
heterogeneity and irreducibility of both political models. In this respect, the canonical
reading which the classical French school of Public Law: Esmein, Duguit, Hauriou ...
and in particular Carre de Malberg, has passed on to us, and which has come to be
the main source of the legacy of public law resulting from the revolution, has
undoubtedly contributed to increasing these mistakes.
Fortunately, and not only as a result of the innovative impulse that the Furet
school gave to the analysis of political affairs, the vacuum surrounding Sieyes has
slowly begun to be filled at the same time that the studies on revolutionary political
thought, Public Law and the theory of the State have been enriched. In this respect,
the studies of E. Schmitt, P. Pasquino, M. Forsyth, B. Manin and in particular C.
Clavreul meant decisive advances in understanding and analyzing the abbot's work.
These research studies have, in fact, brought to light the presence of a complex
model, a different paradigm in the political-ideological debate of the Revolution that
shows Sieyes as the most profound thinker of the Revolution. In this respect,
Clavreul's contribution has particular importance, inasmuch as, while providing the
most systematic analysis so far of Sieyes' system, he undertook the entire
transcription and study of the abbot's unpublished writings, notes and passages that,
now recovered, are currently deposited in the National Archives in Paris.
Unpublished writings that modulate and clarify many of the uncertainties of the
thought and evolution of the abbot's points of view.
The objective of this paper, far from any attempt to replace neglect by an
acritical mythification, is none other than to advance some of the results of a
research study in progress on the Theory of the State of the French Revolution.
Specifically, by restricting ourselves exclusively to the first stage of the Revolution,
we will discuss the articulation and development of two key concepts in Sieyes'
thought: Nation and Representation. Thus, we will attempt to show the specific
nature of his theoretical formulation in relation to the dominant discourse in the 1791
Constituent. Hence, we will show how the interpretation of his proposals in European
Public Law are incorrect.
Both concepts, chosen as the backbone of our analysis, provide in their
abstraction very effective theoretical effects on the whole of the abbot's extremely
harmonized and coherent system. But also, his interest, we understand, goes beyond
the mere sphere of a necessary critical and updated "Dogmengeschichte”, to reach
the contemporary debate itself on democracy and representation, a debate which is
sometimes too hastily believed to be solved.
In this context, it is absolutely essential to clarify the scope the term "concept"
has in Sieyes' work. Above all, the science that the abbot postulates, the "Art Social",
has two closely related aspects. On the one hand it must analyze the specific society
of its time, describe the world of facts. But in addition to this its "analyse en raison"
has a regulatory aspect which affects the building and design of new political
institutions, the new “public law”. The social mechanism that the abbot proposes is
characterized precisely by this close, indissoluble formulation of fact and law, of what
is and what should be: "La physique ne peut être que la connaissance de ce qui est.
L'art social se propose de plier et d'accommoder les faits à nos besoins et à nos
jouissances; il demande ce qui doit être pour l'utilité des hommes" (Vues sur les
moyens d'execution).
It is a regulatory decantation involving a reformulation of the Theory of the
State in terms of Public Law and, most particularly, as we will see later, as principles,
as bases of Constitutional Law, "Allgemeinestaatslehre" of the State -this "Être de
raison"- which enlightens the Revolution.
Such an epistemological statement has, in turn, a double effect. First of all, the
"analyse en raison" openly presents itself in rupture with history, and gives privilege
to will and reason over tradition: "Quel doit être la véritable science, celle des faits ou
celle des principes?" Thus, he postulates the creation of the new positive artificial
political order, as a decision free from bonds with the past. This is contrary to the
historical idea that, from Burke to Hegel, by way of Rehberg, would in one way or
another defend "constitutional" evolutionism against the break brought about by the
Revolution. Secondly, within a pre-critical rationalism (which should not be
overlooked), the abbot's social mechanisms serve the institutional efficacy of the
concepts to a greater extent than their abstract theoretical design. Therefore, his
system owes less to the ideal perfectionism of Begriff than to the empirical
contrasting of the various mechanisms of the "établissement politique”, in his
adaptation to -and at the same time correction of (that excessive "natural inequality"),
the society of his time.
I
Let us examine, then, the first of the above-mentioned concepts: Nation. The
canonical version that Carré provides on the subject is well known, that of the
revolutionary idea of Nation in his Contribution à la Théorie Générale de l'État. That
is, an exclusively legal/abstract concept of nation as a center for attributing
sovereignty; it cannot be extended to the set of individuals who form the French
community, and is clearly different from the "people". The Nation, then, is solely
considered as the other face of the State: "L'État n'est que la nation même
juridiquement organisée". We shall not pursue this, because it is so well known.
However, in what follows we will attempt briefly to show that in a very different
way in Sieyes: 1. There is a double, bipolar concept of nation; 2. That in the
articulation of both parts of it there lies the specific nature of his theory on this
subject; and lastly 3. That from such an essential synthesis decisive theoretical
effects result for the whole of his entire system.
In particular, in Sieyes' discourse we can clearly find both a legal-political
concept of Nation, centered around the problem of the title of sovereignty, and a
socio-political concept of nation, understood as a specific community of citizens, as a
social whole. Let us look at each of them individually and in their relationship to each
other.
First of all, the concept of nation as a social whole. There can be no doubt at
all that, as well as the legal-political concept of Nation, there is a substantial social
significance attached to the meaning of nation as a community of citizens. "Une
chose vivante" in Sieyes' writings: "Où prendre la nation? Où elle est: dans les
quarante mille paroisses qui embrassent tout le territoire, tous les habitants et
tributaires de la chose publique: c'est là sans doute la nation" (Qu'est-ce que le Tiers
état). This is also the last meaning of the famous principle: "Le Tiers état est une
nation complette".
Thus, as a sociopolitical concept, nation applies to the community of the
French (we shall see later on who they are and how they form it), situated in the
State of nature and therefore prior to the State (l'État social): "La nation existe avant
tout, elle est l'origine de tout. Avant elle et au-dessus d'elle il n'y a que le droit
naturel... Une nation ne sort jamais de l'état de nature" (Qu'est-ce que ... ).
Now, with regard to the "ordre naturel" that forms the nation, whereas the
classical natural law, and Rousseau himself, abstract the principles governing the
political order from an bstract and a-historical human nature, Sieyes approaches
men as subjects determined in time and space by the socio conomic structure of the
society of their age, namely 18th century France. This "state of nature" is understood,
then, from a clearly economic viewpoint, following the lines of thought of the
economists of the age that Sieyes, as shown by his unpublished writings and notes
before the Revolution, had studied extensively and profoundly. This is our author's
analytical point of departure: the economic structure of France in that era becomes
the basis, to which the newly created public establishment has to adapt, while
correcting its excesses. Since the economic system is seen to be particularly
dynamic, the State has to evolve at the same time, and adjust the material nature of
its institutions to the changes brought about by unceasing social and economic
progress.
A fundamental feature of Sieyes' system is outlined here: political and
regulatory order rationally adapted to a society seen as a sum of property and liberty,
a market society founded on trade between free independent workers. Thus, this is a
clear approach by Sieyes to Locke's ideas and at the same time a move away from
Rousseau's ideas. A move towards Locke and away from Rousseau, which will not
cease to become more profound as the abbot develops his discourse.
Now, pointing out the generic debt that Sieyes owes to the economists is only
an initial step towards understanding the kind of "state of nature" of that principle,
which requires further clarification. In fact, Sieyes does not agree at all with the
physiocrats that Land is the sole basis of value and the only source of wealth. On the
contrary, he ascribes to the theory of value-labor, the basic outlines of which can be
found in his unpublished writings: "C'est le travail qui forme la richesse. Parmi les
jouissances il faut distinguer celles que tout le monde se procure ou peut se procurer
sans les acheter, de celles qu'on est obligé d'acquérir par un travail ou par le titre qui
le représente. Nous donnons le nom de richesses a toutes les collections de biens
acquis par les travaux" (Lettres aux économistes).
His proximity to Smith in his criticism of the physiocrats, for having constructed
a political economy on circulation and not on production, is also continued in the
theory of the division of labor, which as we shall see is of the utmost importance for
Sieyes' political thought.
Now, if "le travail général est donc le fondement de la société, et l'ordre social
n'est que le meilleur ordre possible des travaux" (Lettres...), the criticism of
physiocratic thinking is shown to be central, both for the purposes of determining the
French nation in its state of nature, and for the purposes of considering the politics of
modernity: "Les peuples Européens modernes ressemblent bien peu aux peuples
anciens. Il ne s'agit parmi nous que de Commerce, d'Agriculture, de fabriques. Le
désir de richesses semble ne faire de tous les États de l'Europe que de vastes
ateliers. Aussi les systèmes politiques, aujourd'hui, sont exclusivement fondés sur le
travail" (Dire sur le veto royal).
For the rest, Sieyes, in agreement with the above, distinguishes three very
different social classes from those of Quesnay: the wealth-producing class, the
("communicatrice") class, which circulates wealth, and lastly the political class, which
maintains political order and guarantees the functioning of production and the
market. As a corollary to all this, the nation is understood to be the community of
producers of value, in the wide sense of "travaux particuliers et fonctions publiques".
This has at least three decisive political consequences, which are:
1.- First of all, not all the French people form the French nation. The nation is a
group of producers, which should include traders and industrialists, as well as
politicians and civil servants, and even the "most menial domestic services". In short,
the nation is the Third State and "the Third state is a complete Nation”. Similarly and
at the same time, because of their "fa neantisse”, Nobility is definitely excluded from
the Nation.
If the nation, as "engagement”, is formed spontaneously by virtue of the
necessity men have to attend to their needs ("be oins") and the advantages that the
group has to carry out their productive activities, the exclusion of those sectors which
are indebted to Privilege is imposed precisely because of that radical and original
removal from the national "common interest" that derives from the c nsubstantial
parasitism of anyone who "vitde ses ancêtres" (Essai sur les Privilèges).
2.- The nation, as a social whole that has its limits marked by its productivity,
also provides, according to the division of labor that Sieyes develops even before the
appearance in 1776 of "The Wealth of Nations", a d in a wider sense than Smith, a
key criteria in the structuring of the State. In fact, the "travail en représ tation" has
its continuity in the political structure as this separates those who govern from those
who are governed, a separation based on technical specialization. Thus,
representation is born, as a completely central and essential framework for the whole
construction of the "social state”, but it also appears as a "representative
government" of experts.
Against the myth of the "Agora”, that is freedom understood as compulsory
and absorbing parliamentary participation by all citizens in the affairs of the State, the
abbot considers freedom, as a basis of social order. It is a product that allows to
delegate the affairs of government to the most capable through subtle and complex
mechanisms of representation and control, so that the majority of citizens can carry
out the activities of production and trade which belong to the civil society of their time:
"à l'abri de la sécurité commune, je me livrerai tranquillement à mes projets
personnels, je suivrai ma félicité comme je l'entendrai, assuré de ne rencontrer des
bonnes légales à mes désirs que celles que la société me prescrira pour l'intérêt
commun, auquel je part et avec lequel mon intérêt particulier a fait une alliance si
utile" (Qu'est-ce que...). This "in nuce" is the problem of Constant's "Liberté des
modernes", "political freedom" as a guarantee for exercising true "civil freedom".
Representation which in no way, as we will see later, means alienation of the citizen's
political will, nor the elimination of all instance of participation.
However, on the basis of the distinction of three types of interests -individual,
corporate and common, of which only the last can be represented, Siey s clearly
separates public from private. Thus, "la chose commune n'est pas le tout", and
therefore the citizens only have to entrust a very small part of their sphere of
activities to the State. The claim that the State invades the citizens' individual and
private sphere results in the change from the "re-publique" into what Sieyes very
expressively defines as "re-totale”. This absolute authority that "pénètre jusqu'à
l'intérieur de l'homme", this Rousseaunian community spirit, in his opinion inevitably
results in the denial of individual rights, and in fact, in a "mon cale" type of
organization.
3.- Lastly, the flawless solidarity of the Third State is the consequence of the
exclusion of Nobility and the harmony of interests of the producers. The latter is the
result of an economic analysis that concedes equality in front of the law, the equality
of workers and equal value of their work in the market. This social uniformity,
conveyed by the absence of categories of productive/unproductive labor, a surplus
value and unequal exchange, acts as support to the conviction that the expulsion of
the Nobility from the national sphere would resolve the only emerging social
contradiction in a world where different private interests would, under the mantle of
common interests, live in peaceful coexistence. This social uniformity, after cleansing
the social body of its aristocratic excrescence, establishes the bases that allow, but in
no way guarantee, nor mean for Sieyes its automatic existence, the emergence of a
national will.
As a subsequent result, political parties and political groups are not only
considered by our author to be unnecessary but also actually harmful, when
corporate and group interests are placed outside public/state and private/individual
affairs: "La grande difficulté vient donc de l'intérêt par lequel un citoyen s'accorde
avec quelques autres seulement. Celui-ci permet de se concerter, de se liguer; par
lui se combinent les projets dangereux pour la communauté". Nothing, then, should
intervene between public and private affairs, between the State and the citizens.
In fact, the abbot does not consider the people as "the material that comprises
the edifice of the State" (Hobbes), nor the only "personal sphere of operation of the
legal code" (Kelsen). The people tend to be the set of producers, the Third State.
And, while economically active, they become, broadly speaking, the nation itself: "le
peuple ou la Nation ne peut avoir qu'une voix, celle de la législature nationale" (Dire
sur le veto). Thus, the social aspect of the nation, placed in the "state of nature",
takes in Sieyes the outlines granted by civil society, from which the state Leviathan
emerges, monopolizing the political power previously dispersed in civil society.
But, as we said, the concept of nation in Sieyes presents another aspect: the
nation as a legal-political subject: "Un corps d'associés vivant sous une loi commune
et représentés par la même législature". It is a very well known fact that the classical
theory of the 1791 Constitution Committee gave this subject-nation the title of
national sovereignty: "le principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans
la nation". This theory was developed by the French classics of Public Law and fixed
in canonical terms by Carré de Malberg.
Now, it is an extremely notable fact that Sieyes in no way uses the concept of
"national sovereignty" in any of his writings, but on the contrary, on several occasions
he proceeds to a detailed and radical deconstruction of it, most of the time implicitly,
but at others openly and explicitly.
The key to such a significant elision must be found in the specific formulation
that Sieyes makes of the central distinction between title and exercise of public
power. In fact, instead of merging both sides, putting the people in the place of the
nation and preaching the inalienability of a previously constituted will, i.e. Rousseau's
theory of popular sovereignty, our author gives the nation the title of constituent
power, which he radically differentiates from constituted powers.
Thus the nation emerges from the field of civil society and from social subject
becomes a legal-public subject. In fact, in the second era of the formation of a
political society, the nation puts into effect a common will, by exercising its natural
rights "la volonté nationale n'a besoin que de sa réalité pour être toujours légale, elle
est l'origine de toute légalité ... N'existant que dans l'ordre naturel, leur volonté, pour
sortir tout son effet, n'a besoin que de les caractères naturels d'une volonté" (Qu'est-
ce que le Tiers).
Now, such a theory of the nation as the holder of constituent power and the
resulting derived and non original character of constituted powers, enables Sieyes to
move the people from the immediacy of exercising power, replacing them by their
representatives elected for this purpose: "L s associés sont trop nombreux et
répandus sur une surface trop étendue, pour exercer facilement eux-mêmes leur
volonté commune. Que font-ils? Ils en détachent tout ce qui est nécessaire, pour
veiller et pourvoir aux soins publics; et cette portion de volonté nationale et par
conséquent de pouvoir, ils en confient l'exercice a quelques-uns d'entre eux".
Now, the community is not stripped of its will, inasmuch as it is inalienable, nor
does it entrust more than the bare "portion qui est nécessaire pour maintenir le bon
ordre". Thus, unlike the absolute way Rousseau surrenders, that "mettre en commun
ses biens, sa personne, sa vie et toute sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la
volonté générale" (Du Contrat Social), Sieyes secularizes the legitimacy of the State,
establishing its control and limitation as the task of social art and an effect of the
systematic mistrust in the uncurbed general will. For this reason, popular sovereignty,
in his opinion, is an imitation of absolute power and a theoretical principle of the "re-
totale”. He therefore proceeds to a decisive deconstruction of the stated concept: "la
souveraineté, même populaire, est une conception royaliste et monacale, une
conception destructrice de la liberté... ce mot ne s'est présenté si colossal devant
l'imagination des français, encore pleins de superstitions royales, que parce qu'ils se
sont fait un devoir de le doter de l'héritage pompeux et des attributs du pouvoir
absolu" (Discours 2 Thermidor).
Sovereignty, unlimited power by definition, and therefore "un monstre en
politique" is substituted by the theory of constituent power/constituted powers. By
means of this, as far as the exercise of power is concerned, Sieyes does not replace
the nation for the people, but for the representatives (ordinary or extraordinary), in its
bare immediacy. Its constituent authority having been exercised, the nation becomes
a latent state, keeping a power in reserve. Because, in fact, as we will see, we
cannot easily accept, following Schmitt's metaphor in the now classic passages of his
"Verfassungslehre", that in Sieyes, the people only occupy the place that was
reserved for God in the theory of the divine origin of royal power. This is so because,
while the nation does not alienate its power, that is, it is not dissolved for ever after
the exercise of constituent power, nothing prevents it from exceptionally reappearing
in order to "resaisir" the latter and alter the bases of the whole legal order.
The replacement of the problems of national sovereignty by those of
constituent power/constituted powers in Sieyes, although devaluated by the French
classics of public law, would in due course be magnificently underlined by some
German scholars. In fact, attention was very soon paid to Sieyes at the end of the
18th century in Germany, and this resulted in Ebel's anthology of his Politische
Schriften (Leipzig, 1796), or the books of K.E. Oelsner: Bruchstücke aus den
Papieren eines Augenzeugen un unparteiischen Beobachters der französischen
Revolution (Leipzig, 1794) and Des opinions politigues du citoyen Sieyes (Paris,
1799). But also at the beginning of the century, in studies that have become classics,
reputable German public law experts tackled the theory of the state of the revolution,
with special attention to Sieyes. Thus: Egon Zweig Die Lehre vom Pouvoir
Constituant (Tübingen, 1909); R. Redslob Die Staatstheorien der französischen
national-versammlung von 1789 (Leipzig, 1912) and K. Löwenstein Volk und
Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französische- nationalversammlung von 1789
(München,1922).
These are works that have highlighted how Sieyes' theory of constituent power
finally draws away from Hobbes' statements in which the State is seen as absolute
representation. The "pactum representationis" created -from the previous social
dispersion, the unity of the people more than the State. But yhe same happens in
relation to Rousseau, where pure democracy turns into the unlimited power of the
legislator, who becomes omnipotent, and therefore detached from any positive limit
in the exercise of his legislative will: "il n'y a ni peu y avoir d'autre loi fondamentale
proprement dite que le seul pacte Sociale" (L'Emile). If against the first Sieyes
defined the nation as a social body linked by mutual interest, against the second, he
would proceed to clearly distinguish civil society and State. That is, between the
social contract that originates the community subject of the nation of a natural order:
"Ce n'est point la Nation que l'on constitue, c'est son établissement politique"
(Préliminaire de la Constitution)... and the positive-legal form, the Constitution, by
means of which it guarantees individual rights,, and organizes the bodies of the
State. Hence, the criticism, definitive from the Theory of the State, that Sieyes directs
at Rousseau for having "confondu lui-même les principes de l'art social avec les
commencements de la société humaine" (Notice sur la vie de Sieyes).
Several theoretical effects result from this distinction between, in Zweig's
terms, "Staatsvolk" and "Staatsverfassung", which should be taken as a whole:
1.- The Constitution, the work of the "extraordinary representation" of
Constituent power, is presented as a rupture with the past, as an expression of
reason impelled by the will and against tradition. A free, non-regulated decision,
attending only to the principles of social art: "Une nation est indépendante de toute
forme; et de quelque manière qu'elle veuille, il suffit que sa volonté paroisse, pour
que tout droit positif cesse devant elle comme devant la source et le maître suprême
de tout droit positif" (Qu'est-ce...)
The problem raised here is not so much the autonomy of constituent power in
relation to the "historical constitution”, certainly resolved, as its relationship with
natural law. In fact, the question in this sphere becomes more complex, since the
work of the "Constituent" of 91 and that of Sieyes himself, are placed, as far as
individual rights are concerned, in the process of transition from natural law to
positivist law. In this positivist direction, which does not reach the radical level that
Payne manifested in relation to the American constitution -"a plain positive
declaration”, Sieyes' position differs for being more positivist than that of the
constitutional committee. And that, first of all, because he postulates a "promulgation
positive et solemnelle", of the list of the Rights of Man and the citizen, that leaves no
doubt as to its legal-constitutional nature: "Les représentants de la Nation, exerçant
les fonctions du Pouvoir Constituant, considèrent d'abord, que toute union sociale, et
par conséquent oute constitution politique, ne peut avoir pour objet que de garantir,
de servir, et d'étendre les Droits de l'Homme vivant en Société; ils jugent donc qu'il
faut commencer par reconnaître ces droits. Ils pensent qu'il est bon de les exposer et
les proclamer, pour ainsi dire, à la tête de la Constitution" (Préliminaire de la
Constitution). And thus it was in fact understood by his contemporaries, because in
words of Oelsner, "according to Sieyes' thinking, clearly and with no doubt at all, a
declaration of rights is the list of the imperative duties that the members of the
constituted legislative body cannot infringe, without violating the established
constitution" (Des opinions politiques, cit. Paris, 1799). But also, effective
constitutionalization, inasmuch as it establishes, for the first time in constitutional
history, a specific legal protection, the "Jury Constitutionnaire" which, although
defined, for the purposes of guaranteeing rights, as a "supplément de jurisdiction
d'équité naturelle aux vides de la jurisdiction positive" (Opinion du 18 Thermidor-),
radically broke with Act 16 of August 1790 (that curtailed judicial control of the laws).
At the same time, as Eschassériaux was to point out in the subsequent debate, "ce
juge suprême mettrait ous les autres sous sa dépendance".
2.- Secondly, the presence of the Constitution as "orma normarum" radically
excludes the omnipotence of constituted powers. And that is particularly evident not
only in relation to the King, but also, and above all, in relation to legislative power in
the strict sense, that in the end becomes as derivative and limited as the former: "Le
Gouvernement n'exerce un pouvoir réel qu'autant qu'il est constitutionnel et... les
représentants ordinaires d'un peuple sont chargés d'exercer dans. les formes
constitutionnelles toute cette portion de la volonté commune".
3.- If possession of constituent power belongs to the Nation, the exercise of it,
however, belongs to the extraordinary representatives especially elected for that
purpose: "Puisqu'une grande nation e peut s'assembler elle-même ... Un corps de
représentants extraordinaires upplée à l'assemblée de cette nation". Therefore,
Sieyes brings in a new distinction between commitment power and constituent
power: "Le peuple doit se borner à exercer par lui-même le seul Pouvoir commettant"
(Quelques idées de Constitution applicables à la Ville de Paris), that is to be limited
to electing and delegating to their representatives the exercise of constituent power,
the right to set up a public establishment.
Sieyes rigorously follows the specific and extraordinary nature of constituent
representation, clearly different from the constituted representation we will see later.
This is so up to the point of postulating in 1789 that, taking into account that
representation of the national Assembly did not adjust to the principles, among other
things, because it performed more functions than the Constituent itself, the
Constitution would not be final until it expressly elected Members of Parliament
"regulièrement delegués pour exercer le seul Pouvoir Constituent”, and proceeded to
reform or approve it.
4.- As we have seen, the Nation is for Sieyes totally above the Constitution,
alien to any form or positivism, possessing constituent power, and at the same time
unique and original in character. On the other hand, the "puissance legislative", so-
called by Montesquieu, is only for Sieyes the "legislative body", a part of the "public
establishment", a derivative body, in short, that performs a specific, constitutionally
regulated function.
Now the Nation, in principle, comes to an end in the shaping of the
sociopolitical subject, the social body of the nation, the third state, and above all, in
the representatively mediated exercise of constituent power. When this occurs, the
nation disappears from its brief presence, on the political scene, and then, in Sieyes'
terms, really becomes a "lieu vide", a "lieu magique". But still, since it does not
alienate its constituent will, it may reappear politically, emerging from its lethargy in
the state of nature.
This of course is an unique explanation of Locke's theory of "trust”, in which
the French classics of Public Law (Smein, Carré, etc) wanted to see the irregular
structural introduction of a moment of "subversion" into Sieyes' system: an element of
fact in the world of law. Such a judgment, which radically minimizes constituent
power, clearly owes much, however, to the postulation by these authors of an
unlimited legislative power. In the absence of the regulatory superiority of the
Constitution, maintained by Sieyes, there would be a kind of two-headedness:
legislative power and constituent power, both of which are considered to be an
expression of national will. Thus, an unmistakable background of "parliamentary
sovereignty" (Duguit) or of an autonomous legislative power "dont on ne trouve plus
trace dans la Constitution" (Carré), eliminates the principle of hierarchy of the legal
order which, on the other hand, becomes important in Sieyes' thinking. For him, in
fact, not only "les décrets primitifs de la volonté nationale" (the Constitution) "sont
antérieurs à toute volonté sociale représentante" (the laws), but also the Constitution
rises as a true higher norm, a criterion of validity of the whole legal order. Thus, for
the abbot, the Constitution, at the same time it gives real practical life to the social
body of the nation, giving legal form to that collective subject of the state of nature, it
also limits the action of constituted powers, not allowing them any arbitrary action
and submitting them in a regulatory manner to what is laid down in the text of the
constitution.
Combined in Sieyes we therefore find rational decision, positivism, regulatory
hierarchy, and formal superiority of the Constitution in relation to Law. Also,
superiority of rank acquires in him a very special efficacy inasmuch as it is postulated
as one of the basic capacities of the afore-mentioned "Jury Constitutionnaire". In fact,
if in 1789 the abbot believed in a spontaneous widespread control of the
constitutionality of laws by the "Opinion Publique”, very soon, as his unpublished
writings show, he began to consider a specific jurisdictional process for this purpose.
Thus, already in Year III he postulates a "Jury Constitutionnaire”, "qui veille avec
fidelité à la garde du dépôt constitutionnel”, as the most suitable process for this
control, and to which both civil servants and private citizens might appeal. Such a
"tribunal de cassation dans l'ordre constitutionnel”, specifically designed to invalidate
the "excedence, l'éxtravasion de pouvoirs" with regard to what is laid down in the text
of the Constitution, is specifically designed, in the "Thermidor Discourses”, to control
the constitutionality of government acts and legislative power. Any hasty comparison,
however, between the jury and a purely jurisdictional constitutional tribunal should be
avoided, since the former had an undeniable political character in that its members
were chosen from among the members of the legislative body.
In fact, the doctrine of constituent power and the rational-regulatory concept of
Constitution in Sieyes is clearly far removed from the classic French doctrine of "la
loi, expression de la volonté nationale”, from the assumptions of which it traditionally
read the debates of 1789-1791 and silenced or weakened Sieyes' specific
contribution.
Now, a final problem arises with this constituent power, and that is: How can a
real national will exist prior to representative legal order, through whose mediation
precisely all will is constructed? it is clear, then, once again, that institutional
mediation is not restricted to expressing, but that it also produces political volition. In
fact, "il a fallu de circonstances très difficiles à réunir, des combinaisons, des efforts
et dangers tant pour endormir et contenir le despotisme que pour faire vouloir le
peuple" (Notes sur la Constitution de l'an VIII).
Precisely, the puzzle begins to be solved thanks to the mediate nature of
constituent power, since the nation delegates it to special representatives, and it is
resolved by establishing the difference between original constituent power and
instituted constituent power. In fact, after approval of the Constitution, there is a
double movement: on one side, the nation returns to the state of nature from which it
will only very occasionally emerge; and on the other, the Constitution will be modified
according to the procedure regulated and stipulated in the constitutional regulations
themselves. Against the "torrent révolutionnaire à l'état brut" mentioned by Carré de
Malberg, instituted constituent power, for Sieyes, replaces the "projet effrayant" of a
permanent constituent power.
And this will precisely be the third of the functions incumbent on the. "Jury
Constitutionnaire": "jury de proposition, pour recueillir les vues qui peuvent tendre à
l'amélioration progressive de l'acte constitutionnel... et donner à notre acte
Constitutionnel, un principe de perfectionnement illimité qui puisse le plier,
l'accommoder aux nécessités de chaque époque, plutôt qu'une faculté de
reproduction ou destruction totale, abandonné au hasard des événements" (Opinion
du 18 Thermidor). In this way, without confusing the "jury constitutionnaire" with
constituent power, by limiting it to the simple proposition of reform, Si yes gives
flexibility to the constitutional review procedure, which in 1789 (Vues sur les moyens)
led him to propose a National Convention designed for that very purpose. It would
automatically meet every thirty-three years, in order to avoid the "permanent
insurrection" of originating constituent power.
II
Let us now proceed  to analyze the concept of representation in Sieyes with a
full background of legal-political consequences implied by the above concept of
nation -as a bond between Civil Society and State.
We have already stressed above that, against the democratic model,
understood as direct government of the people, Sieyes, using his own re-
interpretation of the principle of labor division, proposes the exercise of politics as a
task for the most capable citizens, as well as a civic liberty consisting of "choisir les
experts et en changer souvent”. In this respect, if the nation existed as a social group
prior to legal order and the State, its specific will could only crystallize through the
"mise en forme" of the Constitution and of representation, now constituent, now
constituted, as a central mechanism for constructing a will, in no way given in
advance. Thus, "comme si la nation pouvait parler autrement que par ses
représentants”.
From this, we can conclude consequences of varying importance:
1.- Above all, Sieyes openly rejects that social uniformity -which his analysis of
the nation as producer of value (Third State) showed-, is automatically and
immediately transformed in the political field as a common and definite national
political will -unlike, for example what Marx would propose with regard to the
proletariat, whose condition "an sich" would guarantee, in the last instance, its future
presence "for sich”. For the abbot, in fact, political will is not metaphysically given in
advance, but must be built up through "social mechanisms”, the internal
"combination" of the public establishment, that is to say, representative institutional
mediation. For him, the problem is not at all adapting a political will to an assumed
and original social will, given the abstract and even primitive -because it is natural-
character of the latter. Rather the institutional production of the will, under the rule of
majorities and respect for minorities: "Il faut absolument se résoudre à reconnaître
tous les caractères de la volonté commune dans une pluralité convenue”.
The Assembly, then, should not be limited to -expressing a pre-existing
"desideratum”, but on the contrary "former en commun une volonté commune" and
therefore should freely deliberate in order to reduce the initial plurality to a majority
agreement. This problem of politically bringing multiplicity to relative unity -ope ly
breaking with the paradigm of Rousseaunian immediacy and sociopolitical
transparency- is, in its modernity, the opening up of a thought that will continue not
only the doctrinaire liberalism of Constant or Guizot, but basically the "weimarian"
thought of Heller (Politische demokratie), Kaufmann (Zur problematik des
Volkswillens), Smend, etc.
2.- All this also leads to the appearance of a supreme criterion of political
legitimacy. In fact, if representation means that citizens "sans aliéner leurs droits, en
commettant l'exercice" (Dire sur le veto), from this arises both the necessary free and
general election of political representatives, and the exclusion of the King also in a
"representative" position. The differences between Sieyes' paradigm and the majority
position of the Constitution committee are undoubtedly difficult to ignore: "La
Constitution française est représentative: les représentants ont le Corps législatif et
le Roi" (art. 2).
In fact, in opposition to the acknowledged participation of the King as "co-
legislator" that the committee proposed, certainly close in this to the English model
(and even to Burke's "virtual representation"), Sieyes denies the monarch, -as a non-
elected head of the executive, any contribution at all in the substantial phases of the
legislative process. Therefore, he would be energetically opposed in principle to the
veto, no longer absolute but purely by way of suspension, as would be regulated in
the 1791 Constitution, considering it "une lettre de cachet lancée contre la volonté
nationale" and proposing a merely executive sanction. Thus, after rejecting
Montesquieu's famous distinction between "droit d'empécher" and "droit d'estatuer"
(De l'esprit des lois XI, 6), by virtue of the enormity of the power that was left in the
hands of the King, he would clearly emphasize integral representation, symbolic of
the Nation as "le Tout”, that the former should essentially perform. Colette Clavr ul
has indicated that in Sieyes' unpublished writings there expressly appears the
expression "pouvoir neutre" to designate this moderating function.
We could add to this the quality of "premier Citoyen", with royal participation in
the legislative process being unable to exceed, on the one hand, exercise of the vote
-although "nulle parte son suffrage ne peut en valoir deux"- and the subsequent
sanction and proclamation (Dire sur le veto). According to all indications, Sieyes
appears not to be thinking technically of a constitutional monarchy, but of a
parliamentary one, where the sanction would be introduced as a due act, merely
formal and outside the will of the legislative body, set in approval.
The specific difference of the abbot's position in this respect is even more
noticeable if, when he proposed it in 1791, the term "donnée" was suppressed. A
term that, with clear technical incorrectness, combined the times of approval,
sanction and proclamation of the laws on the date of the royal sanction, because
"semblerait vouloir nous apprendre que le véritable législateur est le roi, puisque la
loi serait donnée par la sanction”. As a result, the abbot would require a record to be
made of the proclamation date, taking into account that "es  la plus essentielle à
connaître; car c'est de ce jour-là seulement que les citoyens sont obligés de s'y
soumettre" (Moniteur, VIII, p. 286). Thus, the law is not conceived by Sieyes as a
complex act according to the model of constitutional monarchy (Laband), in which "le
monarque veut à la fois le contenu de la loi et sa force impérative" (Carré), a residue
from the monarchic principle. Quite on the contrary, the law becomes the exclusive
heritage (as regards establishment and legal validity) of the National Assembly and,
at the same time, the royal sanction becomes a mere integrating requisite of its
efficacy.
In a similar way to what occurred with the concept of nation, there is in Sieye
a concept of representation that would crystallize in the 1791 text and that is
irreducible to the majority position of the Constitution Committee. An idea of
representative government that, although it undergoes political-organizational
changes as the years go by, it would from the point of view of its bases, remain
however untouched.
In fact, in relation to the existence of two assumed, radically different phases
in the abbot's thinking on representation -the first one governed by a Rousseaunian
spirit, accepting the imperative mandate, while the second would accept the
representative mandate in terms similar to those of the Constitution Committee-, a
detailed analysis of the texts shows that, apart from some shifts, there is an essential
continuity. Therefore, the break between a first and a second Sieyes, suggested by
authors such as Zweig or Löwenstein (op. cit.), following Gierke in his classic work
Althussius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien (1880), cannot be
accepted. Quite on the contrary, in the abbot we find a specific idea of representation
as "délégation sans aliénation" and "edifice représentative de base démocratique",
which is clearly different from the one that triumphed in the 1791 Constitution (to
which Carré wrongly takes him) and continues with various organic-institutional
crystallizations throughout all his writings. From such an idea of representation, we
can synthesize the key moments, that is to say:
A.- First of all, and once again in opposition to Rousseau, Sieyes demands at
all times a "vraie représentation;" namely, the representative acts on behalf of the
represented party, there only being a prior generic content, but in no way a specific
will to be transmitted. The political will is constructed throughout the process of
representative mediation, excluding the mere transfer by the representative of a
preliminary and originating content. As a result, representation must be free and not
a Rousseaunian "pouvoir commis”, incapable of reducing diverse multiplicity to the
minimum indispensable political unity. Only in this way will the synthesis of the
general will as the will of the majority be reached: "la méthode de détacher de
simples porteurs de votes est essentiellement vicieuse: les Députés, obligés de s'en
tenir scrupuleusement à l'avis de leurs commettants, ne pouvant point se concilier
entr'eux, il devient souvent impossible de tirer de la totalité des votes une volonté
commune; or c'est la volonté commune qu'il faut... la communauté se détermine donc
à accorder plus de confiance à ses mandataires. Elle les fonde de procuration, à
l'effet de se réunir, de délibérer, de se concilier, et de vouloir en commun: alors, au-
lieu de simples porteurs de votes, elle a de vrais représentants" (Vues sur les
moyens).
From this starting point, Sieyes constructs a very characteristic and original
mandate of representation, the features of which are:
a.- Exclusion of the imperative mandate, characteristic of democracy, because
it would make the common decision and agreements ("déliberations") impossible: "Le
Peuple dans un pays qui n'est pas une démocratie (et la France n  saurait l'être)...
ne peut parler, ne peut agir que par ses Représentants" (Dire sur le veto).
b.- But, and this is decisive, exclusion also of the "tout court" representative
mandate, taking into account that the characteristic dynamics of the "trust”, of the
confidence that is placed in the base of its whole system, prevent alienation of the
rights of the represented party and absolute autonomy of the representative from any
control other than a purely electoral one. Therefore, unlike the 1791 text, Sieyes
introduces the possibility of annulment: "Mais la mission donnée aux représentants
ne peut jamais être une aliénation. Cette mission est essentiellement libre,
constamment révocable, et limitée, au gré des commettants, pour le temps ainsi que
pour la nature des affaires (pouvoir constituant ou fonction législative, R.M.)" (Vues).
Hence, then, the irreducible specificity of Sieyes' theory of representation, that
crystallizes in a "gouvernement représentatif”, formulated, according to his own
words, as a "base démocratique t l'édifice représentative" (Bases de l'État social).
This in turn is transformed into two different effects:
1.- First of all, the afore-mentioned democratic base of the representative
edifice would be formed by the primary Assemblies. Th e, in Sieyes' model, are
regulated not only for a merely electoral purpose, after which they would disappear,
but as true bodies of control and participation by the citizens, a collective "eil de la
Révolution”, basic bodies of democracy with the capacity for dismissal and exclusion
(not of imperative mandate), designed to "raffraichir les représentants d'esprit
démocratique" (Bases). This function would, however, be eliminated by the
Constitution Committee.
2.- Secondly, and inasmuch as for our author "tout est représentation dans
l'État social”, representation would go beyond the mere sphere of legislative power,
to reach the executive and judicial bodies: "toussont représentants”.
Thus, the identity of the constitutional legal statute of these powers (more
precisely, of these bodies that perform different functions) excludes all possible
hierarchical arrangement between them, since, as we have already said, they are not
original and equally derive from the Constitution, even the legislative power.
Sieyes' idea of "representative government" is thus shown to be entirely
different. First, as a corollary of the hierarchical superiority of the Constitution,
resulting from the theory of the constituent power of the nation, it explodes the myth
of legislative power as a privileged expression of the national will. Secondly, centered
on the constructive nature of common will, developed by the various institutions of
the public establishment, it pays equal attention to each and every one of the
constitutional bodies in their functional specialization.
Taking all this as a whole, the model of representation put forward by Sieyes
is clearly different from the representative mandate, as it would be established in the
1791 Constitution, from where it would pass to western constitutional Law, and which
involves the absolute autonomy of the representative in relation to the represented
parties. Very differently, his model of a democratic base and representative edifice
shows completely original features, among which the following are worthy of note:
1.- Reduction in the mandate period (three years) and annual renewal by
thirds, as well as no immediate re-eligibility until a period of three years has elapsed.
The primary Assemblies would elect the first and second thirds to terminate, and so
the members of parliament would be controlled, as they would avoid being
terminated first; in fact, "on s'efforcera de ne pas mériter ce choix" (Quelques idées
de Constitution).
2.- Possibility of dismissal and exclusion of the members of parliament by the
primary Assemblies, should confidence in the representative be lost. Annulment
would, however, in order to guarantee controlled use of the institution, require a
reinforced majority of three quarters of the elected Assembly. Thus, the primary
Assemblies, as well as a purely electoral function, would provide that "fresh
democratic air" of impetus and supervision of the whole representative edifice at its
three levels: Municipal, Departmental and National.
3.- Complete reorganization of the French political territory, which Sieyes calls
"Adunation politique”, on the basis of departmental units and the establishment of a
system of proportional representation by way of three different factors:
1.- Territory: Where the uniformity of surface area of the new departments
would be transformed into a fixed number of members of parliament for each one of
them.
2.- Population: A certain number of members of parliament would be
distributed in proportion to the respective population of the departments.
3.- Contribution: A higher rate of tax payment -including both the volume of
taxes and the amount of the voluntary tax that opens the doors to active citizens, as
we shall see later-, would be transformed equally into a greater number of members
of parliament.
"Adunation" comprises the last reason of a representative State which is
configured as unitary and also centralized, openly excluding federalism: "La France
ne doit point être un assemblage de petites Nations, qui se gouverneront séparément
en Démocraties; elle n'est point une collection d'États; elle est un tout unique,
composé de parties intégrantes; ces parties ne doivent point avoir séparément une
existence complète parce que ne sont que des parties ne formant qu'un seul tout”.
4.- Creation of a true Public Opinion through transparency in decision making,
development of the press and circulation of books and pamphlets of political debate,
as well as, and in particular, the establishment of a new and effective system of
Public Instruction. Sieyes would develop all these items in very interesting new
detailed legislative projects.
5.- Lastly, creation of a "citizens' moral sense" for active participation in
politics, designed to involve the largest possible number of citizens in the democratic
base of election and control (active citizenry) of the representative edifice, and save
the constitution from a new "political aristocracy”. In this respect, Siey s would
design both calendars of national holidays, honors and celebrations in praise of civic
values.
As we can see, a representative system such as the one above, based on a
confidence submitted to a control of the representatives as individuals (dismissal)
and not on their acts (exclusion of the imperative mandate), as well as on a
formulation of democracy of participation and representation, is clearly different from
the 1791 model. As we already know, the latter excluded any control by the voter on
the person elected, and reduced political participation to mere election.
B.- A central part of Sieyes, "representative government" is, then, the
important role played by the primary Assemblies, which the author also calls
"Comitia”. In each district, these primary Assemblies were made up of politically
active citizens (according to the criteria that we shall examine later) in a number
never higher than six or seven hundred, in which case they would be subdivided.
Far from being dissolved, once their electoral commitment had been made (as
the Constitution Committee would establish), among the additional functions that
Sieyes gives them, the most notable for our purposes here is the preparation of the
eligibility lists from which candidates would be proposed. This function would also be
eliminated by the Constitution Committee and would not appear in the 1791 text.
In fact, in the absence of political parties for the reasons stated above, the
abbot assigned to the "comitia" the selection of candidates at an initial level. For the
rest, another such would occur at the departmental and national levels. All active
citizens who were worthy of such an "honor”, taking into account that to be eligible is
not a right but a honorific recognition of a special merit of citizenship, would be
entered on the list of those eligible.
Every year, the primary Assemblies would draw up these lists of eligible
people by a majority vote, and nobody could assume any public position without
having previously been on one of them for at least one year. The candidates that
would appear on these lists would either be elected (in the case of the legislative
body, in ascending order), or appointed by the higher level, that is, the local civil
servants by the provincials, the latter by the nationals etc. (in the case of
administrative-executive power, in descending order). Thus, the primary Assemblies
would provide lists of those people eligible both for election to the national Assembly,
at the first stage, and for appointment by the top civil servants of the Government.
Even if those who are administered do not appoint them, civil servants should be
trusted, strictly in agreement with the character that Sieyes gives them of
representatives.
Here in fact is the ultimate meaning of the abbot's cryptic and usually
misinterpreted expression: "La confiance vien d'en bas, le pouvoir vien d'en haut”.
Now, the loss of confidence leads to the break up of the representative bond
in two ways: dismissal (termination of a representative during his mandate period), or
exclusion (non-inclusion in the annual eligibility list).
In this way, in the legislative order, representatives could be dismissed by their
electors’ assemblies, and excluded by the assembly that appointed them eligible (by
a 3/4 majority). In turn, in the government, representatives could be dismissed by
their hierarchical superiors and excluded by the respective primary Assemblies. In
the judicial order, there was an annual elimination scrutiny, where a blank vote would
mean support for the judge, and other alternative names could be proposed
(Nouvelle organisation de la Police et la Justice).
After year 3, in face of the avant-garde instrumentation of the sections by the
Jacobins, Sieyes was to devise an appeals system before the "Jury
Constitutionnaire" to contest representatives. Control would become judicial and de-
politicized, bearing in mind nonexistence of the imperative mandate that would take
away from the primary Assemblies the task of dismissal, but not exclusion.
C.- Moreover, as far as the citizens' statute is concerned, there are substantial
differences between Sieyes' idea and that of the constitutional report.
In fact, after the apparent acceptance by the Constitution committee of the
abbot's distinction between active citizens, who enjoyed political rights, and passive
citizens, who only had the general advantages of protection and security of the public
establishment, there were definitely underlying diverging perspectives. Agreement
would center around an elitist and census focused concept of the passive electorate:
they all accepted the need for the census requirement, income level, interest and
responsibility for public affairs, intellectual capacity, and education. That is,
government should belong to the "classes available”. In order to be elected to the
national Assembly, it would be necessary to pay the famous silver mark and to own
an established property.
Both agreed, also, that active citizens performed military service in the
National Guard (from which the Act of 15.06.1790 excluded passive citizens), took
part in juries, and contributed financially in maintaining the State. Now, in order to
become an active citizen, Sieyes proposed a very small civic tax ("la plus petite taxe
possible") and voluntary in nature. This contribution would demonstrate the minimum
interest in public affairs necessary for citizens to exercise political rights in the
primary Assemblies in a responsible fashion, and in no way was it designed to
exclude large sectors of the population from voting. In fact, for the abbot, and central
to his philosophy: "les droits politiques doivent être attachés non a la propreté mais a
la personne" (Instructions à donner aux bailliages). Here we find an essential
difference: while for Sieyes suffrage is a right, that only economic and political
backwardness prevented from becoming immediately generalized, for the constituent
committee, voting is a mere function that the Nation entrusts to a chosen part of its
members. The universal nature of suffrage and the rights of the citizens, that our
author claims, are a central part of his model of representative government: "vous ne
pouvez pas refuser la qualité de Citoyens et les droits du civisme à cette multitude
sans instruction, qu'un travail forcé absorbe en entier. Puisqu'ils doivent obéir à la
Loi, tout comme vous, ils doivent aussi, tout comme vous, concourir à la faire. Ce
concours doit être égal" (Dire sur le veto).
Thus, the constitution committee would establish a voting requirement in order
to be allowed to vote that would "de facto" mean exclusion of the majority of the
population (specifically: a proportion of 16 active citizens per every 100 inhabitants)
and initiated the voting suffrage.
The differences with regard to the active electorate do not stop there,
however. In fact, in this respect, as P quino has indicated, Sieyes is placed in a
perspective tending towards universal suffrage. In fact:
1.- As far as the exclusion of women from the right to vote is concerned, the
abbot states that, while in European countries women can be queens; "par une
singulière contradiction", they are excluded from exercising the vote, and so:
"D'après un préjugé qui ne se permet pas môme le doute à cette égard, nous
sommes donc forcés de retrancher au moins la moitié de la population totale"
(Observations ur le rapport du Comité de Constitution). This is a position that as in
everything regarding representation, places the abbot close to Condorcet's position
and clearly against both that of the Constitution Committee and the J cobins.
2.-.Equally significant is the exclusion of beggars and vagrants for technical
reasons from guarantee of census, or of domestic servants, because of their
presumable captive vote: "ceux qu'une dépendance servile tient attachés aux
volontés arbitraires d'un maître".
3.- Lastly, the number of passive citizens is considered by Sieyes in a dynamic
perspective of progressive reduction. And it could not be otherwise, because his
concept of representative Government takes in both the formal aspect of
representation and, formulated as an open process, or to express it in Böckenförde's
terms "inhaltliche Repräsentationsbegriff" (Demokratie und Repräsentation), namely
recognition, involvement and real participation by the citizens in control of the public
establishment, in short, substantial representation: "délégation sans aliénation".
Finally, and very briefly, it is perhaps interesting to mention the results that
Sieyes' concepts of nation and representations have in his critical stance against the
principle of separation of powers, according to the British model, which had great
influence not only on Mounier but also on other members of the Constitution
committee (Lally-Tollendal, Bergasse, Clermont-Tonnerre, tc.).
In fact, the abbot, in the light of everything mentioned above, could not but
express his extreme reluctance to the introduction in France of the British
representative model, and this, at least, was for two basic reasons:
1.- It granted special representation to the nobility as such, which reinforced
privilege in relation to the citizens who were formally equal in the eyes of the law. In
fact, the nobility was no longer a part of a nation reformulated as "le Tiers état".
2.- The conflict between classes and interests was also recorded as a principle
of operation of the British institutions.
Now, Sieyes' model meant that, when the nobility had been eliminated, the
very abolition of Privileges would establish an essential uniformity of social interests
that through the "adunation politique" and a "gouvernement représentatif", would
dispense with the need for a counterbalance of powers conceived as bearers of
different social interests. We can well understand, then, Sieyes' extreme hostility to a
political system such as the British one, whose parliament was comprised of three
bodies: King, House of Lords and House of Commons, precisely opposed in a mutual
"balance".
First of all, for Sieyes, King and Parliament were constituted bodies designed
to exercise two different functions, executive and legislative. Therefore, it was neither
possible for a sovereignty of parliament to be conceived as a supreme expression of
the will of the people, since the law had to be adjusted to the Constitution; nor could
the Monarch be accepted as co-legislator, collaborating only towards integration of
the efficiency 'of the law through the formal requirement of sanction and
proclamation.
Moreover, there was no reason, either, for a division of the legislative into an
Upper House and a House of Commons, both because of the preliminary
"anéantissement" of the Nobility and their lack of place in the new order of the Law,
and the impossibility of a second federal House, excluded by the centralism of the
"adunation".
However, Sieyes would accept an internal division of the legislative body, for
technical reasons. In fact, in his opinion, in the legislative procedure, the decision
should only be taken by a single body, but the proposal and discussion could very
well be distributed into committees or commissions. Thus, its characteristic division of
powers went from "pas employer plusieurs corps de représentants à la construction
du même ouvrage, mais confier a divers représentants des parties différentes de
manière que le résultat produise l'ensemble".
In another way, the functional division of powers would also make hierarchy
among the constituted bodies impossible, and hence lead to disregard for the
centrality of the legislative, so "à la page" in the Revolution. From year III, equal
attention to the whole of the constitutional system would lead Siey s to differentiate
between "executive power" and the "Government". The latter would have a mixed
function between legislative and "executive", according to which the abbot would
even come theoretically to consider an autonomous regulatory power, not resulting
from previous law. This would be merely the beginning of his system becoming
progressively complex, although always under similar basic principles, which deserve
to be treated very substantially on another occasion.
So, on the basis of a nation understood at the same time as a social
community of producers and holder of constituent power, of a criticism of national
sovereignty that is replaced by the superiority of the Constitution over constituted
powers, of a theory of representation that combines a democratic base, annulment
and absence of imperative mandate, etc., the abbot of Fréjus shows us, in the
unusual depth of the problems that he raises, that he really is far-removed from the
present-day image that has made him a spokesman of the principal current of initial
European constitutionalism.
"La Constitution c'est moi"; in the last ravings, of his long life, Sieyes
succeeded in defining in this way the core of what was his basic obsession: a Theory
of the State as the undeniable basis of modern continental Public Law.
BASIC BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bastid, P., Sieyes et sa pensée. Paris, 1970.
Brendin, J.D., Sieyes. La clé de la Révolution Française. Paris, 1988.
Breuer, S. "Nationalstaat und Pouvoir constituant bei Sieyes und Carl Schmitt" ARSP LXX, 1984.
Clavreul, C., L'influence de E. Sieyes sur les origines de la représentation en droit public. These d'État
Sorbonne, 1982.
Forsyth, M., Reason and Revolution: The Political Thought of the Abbé Sieyes. New York, 1987.
Koung, Y., Théorie constitutionnelle de Sieyes. Paris, 1934.
Löwenstein, K., Volk und parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französische nationalversammlung
von 1789. München, 1922.
Moro, R. "L'arte sociale e l'idea di società nel pensiero di Sieyes" Rivista Int. di Filosofia del Diritto. 45,
1968.
Pasquino, P., "E. Sieyes, B Constant et le Gouvernment des modernes". Revue française de Science
Politique, 1988.
id. "Il concetto di rappresentanza e i fondamenti del diritto pubblico de la rivoluzione: E.J. Sieyes" in
Furet, L'eredità della Rivoluzione francese. Bari, 1989
Redslob, R., Die Staatstheorien der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789. Leipzig, 1912.
Schmitt, E., "Representatio in toto und representatio singulariter" Historische Zeitschrift, 1971, 213.
